



#### Cold Start to Improve Market Thickness on Online Advertising Platforms: Data-Driven Algorithms and Field Experiments

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- 1. Introduction and Contribution
- 2. Theory: Model, Algorithm and Analysis
- 3. Practice: Field Implementation, Experiment Design and Empirical Results



#### Online Advertising Platform



- Online advertising platform: Demand Side Platform (DSP)
- Fundamental operations question of a DSP:

When an ad request (user impression) arrives, which ad should be displayed to her?

• Core business logic:

The DSP runs large-scale auctions to determine which ad to display, in order to maximize the advertising revenue of each user ad impression.





#### Performance-Based In-Feed Ads







Mechanism	Charged-upon	Fee-Deduction	Rank-by
oCPC	click	pCVR * bid_convert	eCPM = pCTR * pCVR * bid_convert

Cost Per Click (CPC)

pCTR (predicted CTR) and pCVR (predicted CVR conditioned on click) are produced by underlying deep neural networks of the DSP





## Cold Start on DSP: Ad Retention and Market Thickness





- X-axis: # of conversions per day in the first 3 days.
- Y-axis: Proportion of ads that will stay active on the DSP every single day in the next 2 weeks.
- Everything is rescaled.

- Key observation: If the # of conversions in the cold start period surpasses 10, the long-term retention and value soon flatten.
- Cold start will have a non-linear long-term impact on the market thickness and advertising revenue.
  - Addressing cold start through an operations lens.
- Causality of the figure: PSM and IV analysis.
- The phenomenon of the left figure is robust with respect to different definitions of ad retention.

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•	With the inac balance short	ccurate predictions of CTR and CVR for new ads, how to smartly t-term revenue and long-term market thickness/revenue?	
		Primal-dual based MAB algorithms: Shadow Bidding with Learning (SBL)	
•	With differen	nt ads competing for the same user impressions, how to unbiasedly	

estimate the value of our proposed algorithm?

User-ad two-sided experiment framework







## Highlight of Main Contributions



- End-to-end Solution:
  - Implement a novel data-driven algorithm online to address the cold start challenge for a large-scale advertising platform with minimal engineering adjustments
  - Connect learning theory and online advertising practice
- Theory and Algorithm:
  - Tackle the cold-start challenge through an operations lens
  - SBL algorithm: Duality + MAB + neural networks



- Practice and Experiment:
  - Evaluate our algorithm with two-sided experiments that restore SUTVA
  - Causally demonstrate the significant value of the SBL algorithm to thicken the marketplace (+3.13%) and boost long-term advertising revenue (+5.35%)





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#### Model for Cold Start



- Problem setting: First-price auction, CVR=pCVR=1 (oCPC = CPC)
- A set of new ads  $A:=\{1,2,\ldots,K\}$ , with bids (per conversion)  $\{b_1,b_2,\ldots,b_K\}$
- A set of user impressions, arriving at the DSP sequentially:  $[T]:=\{1,2,\ldots,T\}$
- Context associated with each user:  $x_t \in X$ , *i.i.d.* on a countable set X,  $x_t \sim \mathcal{D}$
- $v_{ij}^t = 0,1$ : Whether a user with context\_i clicks ad\_j in round t;  $y_{tj} = 0,1$ : Whether display ad\_j to user\_t
- CTR  $c_{ij} := \mathbb{E}[v_{ij}^t]$  ,  $\hat{c}_{ij}^t :=$  pCTR estimate by the underlying DNN in round t
- Sequence of events in each round t:







## Reward Upper Bound and Regret



• Our objective is to identify a policy  $\pi$  to maximize the expected reward  $E[\Gamma]$ :



Lemma (Fluid upper bound). We have the following upper bound for the expected reward:  $\frac{1}{T}E_{\mathcal{D}^{T},\pi}[\Gamma] \leq \mathsf{OPT} := \max_{y_{i} \in \Delta_{A}, \forall i} \left\{ \sum_{j=1}^{K} E_{i \sim \mathcal{D}_{X}}[c_{ij}y_{ij}b_{j}] + \sum_{j=1}^{K} \beta_{j} \min\left\{ E_{i \sim \mathcal{D}_{X}}[c_{ij}y_{ij}], \alpha \right\} \right\}$ where  $\Delta_{A}$  is the probability distribution over all the ads and  $y_{i} = (y_{i1}, y_{i2}, \dots, y_{iK}) \in \Delta_{A}$  is the ad assignment distribution for a user with context i.

- The regret of a policy:  $\operatorname{Reg}(\pi) := T \cdot \operatorname{OPT} E_{\mathcal{D}^T, \pi}[\Gamma]$
- We seek to design an algorithm with sublinear regret and implementable on a real DSP.



• The model has a too high dimension to solve efficiently online.



# Duality and Shadow Bidding





- Only K decision variables: Can be efficiently solved using sub-gradient descent!
- $\lambda_j$  is the dual variable for the cold start reward constraint:  $\sum_i \hat{p}_i^t \hat{c}_{ij}^t y_{ij} + u_j \ge \alpha$ - We call  $\lambda_j$  the shadow bid of ad\_j.
- The shadow bid  $\lambda_j$  is bounded from above by the cold start value of ad\_j,  $\beta_j$
- Actionable Insights:
  - Smartly computing the shadow bid of each new ad and incorporating it into the auctions of the DSP could effectively trade off short-term revenues with long-term cold start rewards!
  - Naturally fit into the ad auction system of a DSP in practice.







#### Sketched Regret Analysis



- Key challenges:
  - History-dependent cold start reward (i.e., the knapsack bandit setting)
  - Dual-based bidding strategy implemented on the primal space
  - Regret dependent on the underlying machine learning oracle to predict CTR
  - Too high variance with Inverse Propensity Score to estimate the expected reward
- Key ideas and the road map to overcome the challenges:
  - 1. Establish approximate complementary slackness and bound the duality gap between the empirical primal and the empirical dual, due to tie breaking in SBL by  $O(T^{\frac{1}{3}}(\log T)^{\frac{1}{3}}K^{\frac{1}{3}})$
  - 2. Build an auxiliary reward process independent of history: Each click of ad j generates a reward of  $b_j + \beta_j$ , irrespective of whether the threshold  $\alpha T$  is met. Under SBL, bound the gap between the auxiliary reward process and the optimal reward by  $O(T^{\frac{2}{3}}(\log T)^{\frac{1}{3}}K^{\frac{1}{3}}d^{\frac{1}{2}})$
  - 3. Under SBL, bound the gap between the auxiliary reward process and the true reward process by  $O(T^{\frac{1}{2}}(\log T)^{\frac{1}{2}}K^{\frac{1}{2}})$
  - 4. Putting the above bounds together yields the expected regret of SBL is  $O(T^{\frac{2}{3}}(\log T)^{\frac{1}{3}}K^{\frac{1}{3}}d^{\frac{1}{2}})$





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- 4. Future Research Agenda





### Implementing and Testing SBL



- SBL algorithm implemented on a large-scale video-sharing platform (Platform O).
- How to unbiasedly evaluate the SBL algorithm?
- Naive one-sided experiment designs:
  - Ad-side randomization:

Treatment		Control	Non-Experiment	Mature Ads
New Ads		New Ads	New Ads	
100% UV	Treatment Condition	Control Condition		

• User-side randomization:

	100% New Ads	Mature Ads		
Treatment UV	Treatment Condition			
Control UV	Control Condition			
Non-Experiment UV				

Treatment = oSBL algorithm; Control = baseline algorithm (uniformly increase the bidding price of all new ads)



### Violation of SUTVA



#### Ad-side randomization:

	Treatment New Ads	Control New Ads	Non-Experiment New Ads	Mature Ads	
100% UV	Treatment Condition	Control Condition			

#### • User-side randomization:

	100% New Ads	Mature Ads
Treatment UV	Treatment Condition	
Control UV	Control Condition	
Non-Experiment UV		

- SUTVA (Stable unit treatment valuation assumption): The assignment of one unit to treatment or control will not affect the outcome of another unit.
- Ad-side randomization: 120% overestimate
  - Violation of SUTVA: New ads from different groups compete on the same user impressions.
- User-side randomization: 40% underestimate
  - Violation of SUTVA: The effect of oSBL spills over to the control group users.



#### Two-Sided Experiment Design



#### • A novel two-sided experiment design:

	20% Treatment New Ads	20% Control New Ads	60% Non-Experiment New Ads	Mature Ads	
33% Treatment UV	B11	B12	B13	B14	
33% Control UV	B21	B22	B23	B24	
33% Non-Experiment UV	B31	B32	B33	B34	

- Blue = oSBL, white = baseline algorithm, grey = ad blocked (to remove externalities)
- SUTVA restored! Able to generate unbiased estimates.
- Impact on long-term cold start value: Comparing B11 with B22
- Impact on short-term revenue: Comparing B11+B13+B14 with B22+B23+B24
- Experiments conducted between May 23, 2020, and May 30, 2020
- A simulation system for cold start and experimentation on online advertising platforms open-sourced @GitHub: <u>https://github.com/zikunye2/cold\_start\_to\_improve\_market\_thickness\_simulation</u>

24



### Short- and Long-term Effects of oSBL

#### • Short-term effect of oSBL:

Metric of Interest	Cold start success rate	Cold start reward	Total short-term revenue	CTR Prediction AUC
Relative Change	+61.62%***	+47.71%***	-0.717%**	+7.48%*

• Long-term (post-cold start and post-experiment) effect of oSBL:

Metric of Interest	Market Thickness	CTR	Post-Cold-Start Revenue
Relative Change	+3.13%**	+11.14%***	+34.02%***

Note: The above long-term revenue boost is over-estimated because the treated ads compete with all others on impressions,



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### Simulation Results on Long-Term Ad Revenue



• Long-term (post-cold start and post-experiment) effect of oSBL:

Metric of Interest	Market Thickness	CTR	Post-Cold-Start Revenue
Relative Change	+3.13%**	+11.14%***	+34.02%***

Note: The above long-term revenue boost is over-estimated because the treated ads compete with all others on impressions,

- Simulation study on the global treatment effect of oSBL:
  - Based on 12 million auctions sampled from April 9, 2020, to April 30, 2020.
  - oSBL increases the market thickness by +0%~+5%, and the post-cold-start CTR by 0%~20% (i.e., sensitivity analysis).
  - The total number of ad impressions/auctions remain the same.
  - Simulation model validated by accurately predicting the short-term revenue loss during the experiment.
- oSBL boosts the total long-term revenue by +5.35% (at a magnitude of hundred million USD per year for Platform O) if the market thickness is increased by 3.13% and CTR by 11.46%.

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# Thank You!

# Questions?

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https://rphilipzhang.github.io/rphilipzhang/index.html